Introduction
In 1991, Joseph Weiler made a path-breaking contribution to the study of transnational governance via a captivating claim: The European Union (EU) -perhaps the world's most developed example of regional integration and supranational delegation -is neither solely a bargaining process controlled by European states (ex. Moravcsik 1998) -nor the creation of supranational technocrats at the European Commission (ex. Ross 1995; Sandholtz 1992) . Rather, European integration is a process driven in fundamental ways by the collaborative actions of national and European judges.
In so doing, Weiler articulated a political theory of integration via law that situated the EU within broader processes in the judicialization of politics (Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002; Ginsburg 2003; Hirschl 2007) . In Weiler's view, European political development has been "a narrative of plain and simple judicial empowerment" (Weiler 1991 (Weiler : 2426 . On the one hand, by 'courting' national courts into a dialogue, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) garnered the raw materialdomestic disputes involving national and EU law -to reshape the balance of power between the EU and the member states. On the other hand, by applying EU law over conflicting national law, lower courts in founding member states gained powers of judicial review previously denied. All it took was a willingness to punt cases to the ECJ via Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, known as the "preliminary reference procedure") and set aside national laws when they conflicted with the ECJ's interpretation of EU rules.
In other words, beyond affirming broader claims about the expansion of judicial power vis-à-vis legislative or executive actors, Weiler's theory stresses that it is low-level judges who have the most to gain from European integration: "Lower courts and their judges," Weiler wrote, "were given the facility to engage with the highest jurisdiction in the Community and thus to have de 3 facto judicial review of legislation. For many this would be heady stuff" (Weiler 1991 (Weiler : 2426 . Over the years, Weiler doubled-down on these claims (Weiler 1994: 523) .
This judicial empowerment thesis (hereafter, "JET") quickly became the master frame for analyzing Europe's exemplary process of transnational integration through law (Kelemen & Stone Sweet 2017) . For example, Burley and Mattli influentially elaborated how "assumptions of good will, harmony of interests, or dedication to the common good need not be postulated to account for integration. Ruthless egoism does the trick by itself... While offering lower national courts a "heady" taste of power, the ECJ simultaneously strengthens its own legal legitimacy" (1993: 54; 62) . In a subsequent elaboration, Alter's "inter-court competition" model (Alter 2001 ) emphasized how lower court judges began to collaborate with the ECJ to break from the disliked case law of their superior courts, thereby becoming "the motors of EC legal integration" (Alter 1996: 467) .
In this article, I propose that the JET masks some key dynamics behind the ways transnational integration through law unfolds on the ground, particularly within those domestic judiciaries whose aggregate rates of referral to the ECJ appear to support lower court empowerment arguments. I argue for shifting focus to the way institutional path-dependencies discipline judges' everyday practices and their openness to Europeanization. By probing the lived experience of lower court judges as they manage professional knowledge and their work, it
becomes clear that what appears as an opportunity for empowerment in theory is often perceived as a fastidious burden in practice. Specifically, the reputational drive to mask gaps in EU legal knowledge, the utilitarian incentive to manage one's workload, and the cultural attachment to a traditional self-conception as a civil law judge can interact to entrench habits resistant to collaborating with the European Court. Understanding these micro-politics of judicial practice, then, illuminates how the "judicial construction of Europe" (Stone Sweet 2004; can remain "contained" (Conant 2002 ) and the ways transnational governance via law is negotiated on the ground (Halliday and Shaffer 2015).
To make this argument, I unpack a "most likely" case for the JET to hold -that of the Italian judiciary -and situate it in a broader comparative context of European legal orders. By combining a quantitative analysis of Italian preliminary references to the ECJ with hundreds of qualitative interviews with lawyers and judges, I use process tracing methods to reconstruct the unwritten practices that discipline the dialogue between national and European judges. The results suggest that even within a founding member state of the EU, to this day a broad set of entrenched habits within lower courts obstruct collaborations with the ECJ to enforce EU law. To conclude, I discuss the comparative and theoretical implications of this finding and elucidate future research paths.
Judicial Empowerment Revisited
The JET continues to muster substantial scholarly support. For example, one recent re-evaluation posits that the thesis "underestimated just how transformative the constitutionalization of the EU legal system really was [since] judicially-driven integration proved to be self-reinforcing" (Kelemen & Stone Sweet 2017: 205) . Indeed, most of the debate about the extent to which the EU is a judicial construction has focused less on the dynamics of domestic judicial collaboration with the ECJ and more on the extent to which it liberates the European Court from the influence of national governments (Carrubba et al. 2008; Stone Sweet & Brunell 2012) . Nevertheless, a number of qualifications -and a few challenges -have been made. Alter's scholarship provides one important qualification. She argues that member state governments and national high courts can obstruct a mutually-empowering dialogue between the 2 For an excellent overview, see Phelan (2015: 41-69) .
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ECJ and lower courts, for example by limiting access to lower courts or deriving a Eurosceptic jurisprudence from domestic constitutions (Alter 2000: 513-514; Martinsen 2015) . Importantly, however, the claim that "lower courts are much more willing to send references to the ECJ" (Alter 2000 : 513) remained a component even of Alter's analysis of backlash to European legal integration. Indeed, scholars who have perceptively analyzed national judges' resistance to EU law (Rasmussen 2007; Davies 2013; Bobek 2014; Dyevre 2016 ) have focused primarily on domestic supreme courts (Pollack 2013 (Pollack : 1273 (Pollack -1275 (Alter 2001; Dyevre 2013; Dyevre & Lampach 2017) . A more convincing qualification is provided by Wind (2010) , who finds that judges in Nordic states with a majoritarian political tradition and a scarce history of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism are reluctant to directly support the ECJ's supranational judicial review powers. However, Wind's is more so a claim against the generalizability of the JET rather than a challenge to its validity for the EU's founding member states.
Importantly, none of this scholarship considers the ways European integration unfolds within the everyday work environment of lower courts. By taking seriously this underexplored dimension within one of the judicial orders that inspired the JET in the first place, this article extends this important debate. 6
Theory: European Integration Meets the Everyday Politics of Judging
The proposed argument is simple: Behind the numbers and on the ground, "political integration through law" can be fruitfully studied as a historical institutionalist process (Pierson 1996 ) that sparks a micro-politics of everyday practice and knowledge management within the pre-existing judicial apparatus of national states. To understand the limits of transnational legal governance, we must thus take seriously the ways in which supranational norms are negotiated and resisted 3 in local institutional practice.
In the EU, political integration constitutes "layering'' surpanational laws atop existing domestic laws. Since the EU lacks the tools through which national states coerce compliancesuch as military power or direct taxation ) -compliance with EU law hinges in no small part upon the "conversion" of national courts into European courts of first instance ready to enforce supranational law. 4 Under the JET, national judges interpreted this as a relatively costless political opportunity (Alter 1996: 466) . But like all processes of political development (Orren & Skowronek 2004) , this conversion has not been frictionless, for it entails changing entrenched institutional practices and professional self-understandings to accommodate a new body of rules and legal knowledge. Particularly for judges within lower courts, these pre-existing institutional 7 practices hold such self-reproducing dynamics of "path-dependence" (Mahoney 2000) that -to this day -they resist the costly investments required to dialogue with the ECJ. Three reasons stand out.
First, baseline gaps in knowledge -universal in the past due to the absence of judicial training in European law, and still diffuse today -entail that judges are unlikely to assess the conformity of national law with EU law if unsolicited by a stubborn lawyer, and will seldom incur risks of raising a preliminary reference on their own. That is, because judges seek to protect their individual and collective reputation as custodians of legal expertise (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2015) , they are uncomfortable when (and often seek to avoid) dealing with a relatively unknown field like European law. Second, workload pressures -greatest amongst lower courts -imply that even where a judge acquires knowledge of EU law, their attention will usually be monopolized by the piles of files before them today rather than the prospect of a dialogue with the ECJ tomorrow. This utilitarian drive to manage judicial labor entrenches a type of diffuse, Foucaultian discipline (Foucault 1975 ) that constrains judges' everyday decision making and dissuades breakups of routine to dialogue with the ECJ. Finally, entrenched self-conceptions as national civil law judges foster reluctance to take on the creative role of European judge endowed with the power to disapply national law in favor of EU law. This logic is derived from judges' semiotic identification with the figure of the civil law judge, conceived as an important but relatively uncreative interpreter of Parliamentary statutes (Merryman & Perez-Perdomo 2007 ).
At the "street level" 5 of lower courts, then, the deliberate rebellions against the ECJ by a few supreme courts that have attracted most scholarly attention are replaced by a subtler but more diffuse resistance disciplined by the quotidian demands of the institutional environment. And 8 because the decision to submit a preliminary reference is at the judge's discretion, 6 lower courts were provided with a formal means to evade a dialogue with the ECJ. When a few iconoclastic judges did challenge these practices for motives in line with judicial empowerment, they often incurred reputational costs and remained marginalized.
Research Design: A Most Likely Case Study and Multi-Method Approach
I evaluate the proposed argument via a "most likely case study" of judicial practice in Italy. The case selection logic is to pick a "crucial" case that maximizes the probability that the theory under scrutiny is supported by the resulting empirical evidence. As a result, if contradictory evidence emerges, a strong claim can be made that the theory requires revision (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007: 237-238; Gerring and Cojocaru 2016: 404) .
Italy constitutes a "most likely case" for empowerment for three reasons. First, the Italian judiciary is one of the contexts that inspired the JET in the first place (Weiler 1991 (Weiler : 2426 Alter 1996: 467; 471 subsequently draw from semi-structured interviews with 225 legal professionals. By triangulating between the experience of lawyers who seek preliminary references on the one hand and judges who must decide whether to grant them on the other hand, I leverage process tracing methods (Bennett and Checkel 2015) to reconstruct the lived reality and workplace practices that discipline lower court judges' encounter with EU law.
Quantitative Evidence: Lower Courts as Infrequent Interlocutors of the ECJ
Despite the sophisticated argumentation in Weiler (1991) and Burley and Mattli (1993) , both pieces are remarkably scarce of systematic empirical evidence. The first quantitative statistics cited to support the JET were provided by Alter (2000: 504-505) , who found that "of the ECJ's preliminary ruling decisions discussed in two legal textbooks... 62 percent of the references had been made by lower courts."
When more systematic data began to be collected, however, their bearing on judicial empowerment arguments was more ambiguous (see Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a: 89-90; Cichowski 2007: 80-81 Yet the fundamental problem with this sort of aggregate data analysis is rather obvious, and it astonishing that it has not been hitherto raised: In any judicial system with an organizational hierarchy, there are exponentially more courts of first instance than courts of appeal and last instance. In Italy, for example, the civil court system alone contains some 1,300 tribunali of first instance, 26 courts of appeal, and only one Supreme Court of Cassation. This would be less problematic if the judicial empowerment were a structure-to-structure (Bennett 2013: 218) causal mechanism with lower courts behaving as a single collective actor. Yet in reality it is the single judge (or a panel of judges in a single court) who must decide whether to raise a preliminary reference. In short, the debate surrounding the JET has problematically inferred the propensity of individual courts and judges to refer cases to the ECJ from analyses of aggregate preliminary reference data. 12 each used the reference procedure over 100 times. Note that this analysis is actually rather generous vis-a-vis lower court reference rates, since it comprises only the subset of lower courts who have dialogued with the ECJ at least once. If the denominator comprised all of the thousands of lower courts that could refer to the ECJ, the resulting propensity to refer would approach zero. Clearly, a given lower court judge is exceptionally unlikely to ever refer a case to the ECJ. Relatedly, one might ask: Given that a national court refers to the ECJ at time t, what is the probability that said court refers again at some time t+n? That is, how habitual or temporally stable is reference activity from those lower courts who do dialogue with the ECJ? Once again, the disaggregated findings are stark: A lower Italian court that refers in one year has less than a one in four probability of referring in the subsequent year. By contrast, the parallel statistic for the Court of Cassation and Council of State is 80%. If the time interval is extended to a five-year period, the findings are relatively unchanged. Importantly, these dynamics are relatively time-invariant.
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11 For example, in the pre-1990 period analyzed by Weiler, a repeat referral within a year occurred 21.8% of the time for lower courts and 84.6% of the time for high courts; for a five-year interval, the statistics are 40% for lower courts and 100% for high courts. 13 Finally, one might inquire: For those courts that do refer in back-to-back years (which, again, is the exception for low and mid-level courts), how long does this iterated dialogue with the ECJ last on average? The answer is less than three years for lower and mid-level Italian courts, and over six years for courts of last instance. In other words, when the data is disaggregated at the level at which the JET's causal mechanisms are supposed to operate, the empirical evidence does not conform with the observable implications of the thesis.
Qualitative Evidence: Everyday Practices of Resistance
While revealing, even disaggregated quantitative statistics cannot tell us if Italian lawyers perceive judicial resistance to a dialogue with the ECJ and why it would emerge in the first place. To answer these questions, over 200 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Italian lawyers, judges, and law professors (see Fig. 3 ). Interviewees were probed both for their knowledge of contemporary practices as well as for changes over the past several decades.
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics of interview sample
Notes: The number of interviewees and interviews does not match because some subjects were interviewed repeatedly and others as a group. Note further that many legal professionals occupy multiple roles. 
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Legal practitioners were purposively selected via a form of "standardized" snowball sampling.
Snowballing has been praised for producing findings that are both "emergent" and "interactional" through flexible face-to-face engagement (Gray et al. 2007: 151-178; Noy 2009 ). However, the method can exclude actors central to the causal process of interest by getting stuck in a closed network. As a result, the origins of multiple snowballs across three northern Italian cities (Genoa, Milan, and Trento/Bolzano), three southern Italian cities (Naples, Bari, and Palermo), and the capital of Rome, was standardized: In each city, at least one member of the governing council of the local bar association, of each city tribunal, and of each law school faculty was interviewed.
Furthermore, where possible, interviewees were asked to refer the names of local lawyers or judges with personal experience in referring cases to the ECJ, even if they lay outside their network.
Confronting Judicial Resistance: The experience of "Eurolawyers"
To begin, I provide evidence from semi-structured interviews with lawyers, who are usually the actors who solicit the judge into applying EU law or dialoguing with the ECJ in the first place.
The focus is on interviews that are (1) representative of general sentiments but (2) articulated by lawyers with the greatest experience soliciting preliminary references -whom Vauchez (2015) terms "Eurolawyers." After all, elite interviewing in processualist scholarship should aim to "identify the key political actors that have had most involvement with the processes of interest" (Tansey 2007: 766) . As "repeat players" (Galanter 1974) in the field of EU law, Eurolawyers are uniquely situated illuminate whether lower court judges are "enthusiastic" about opportunities to dialogue with the ECJ.
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The consensus amongst lawyers interviewed is that the national judges' default position is usually resistant to encounters with EU law and the ECJ, that this was particularly true in the past, and that resistance remains concentrated in courts of first instance. This is inconsistent with the observable implications of the JET, since most national judges -particularly in the first decades of the European Community and in lower courts -should have an incentive to collaborate with the ECJ to expand their interpretive powers.
For example, a co-founder of one of the first Italian firms in Milan to specialize in European law in the 1970s notes that a decision by the judge to refer to the ECJ "remains rather rare, and in the past it was virtually impossible…it didn't happen, because judges didn't study this topic, they didn't know it, they looked at you funny as you talked 
Judges and Practices of Resistance
Methodologically, relying solely on interviews with lawyers can be problematic, for two reasons.
First, Eurolawyers may have an inflated sense of their own influence -the problem of "exaggerated roles" that can arise when interviewees discuss their impact over a given social process (Berry 2002: 680 can only speculate as to the reasons behind judges' behavior, since their time in court is usually limited.
In this light, interviews with judges (see Fig. 4 ) are essential to provide external validity to lawyers' claims via "triangulation" (Arksey and Knight 1999: 21-32) . Because judges' reputation (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2015: 24-25 ) depends on the perception of their mastery of the law, their incentive is to stress their practical proficiency in all legal fields. If, on the contrary, judges confirm the presence of diffuse practices resistant to encounters with EU law and the ECJ, then confidence in lawyers' claims is bolstered. Furthermore, judges are privileged witnesses to the everyday institutional pressures that condition their willingness to dialogue with the ECJ, allowing us to illuminate the mechanisms driving the judicial behavior that lawyers describe. 
Knowledge Gaps and Workload Management
The first two logics judges underlined are baseline gaps of knowledge and workload pressures.
These mechanisms are inextricably linked. To be sure, that the first coursework on EU law by the High Council of the Judiciary was only established in 1993 and that judges did not need to know EU law to pass the judicial entrance exam until 1997 is in the public record (Bartolini and Guerrieri 2017: 412-413) . Notably, this situation is not unique to Italy, nor has it significantly improved in recent years: In a 2011 survey of domestic judges, the European Parliament found that three-fifths did not know how to refer cases to the ECJ (Directorate General for Internal Policies 2011: 5).
What is more unique to Italy is another well-known problem, namely that comparatively high litigation rates can overwhelm judges, pressuring them to decide cases quickly (IMF 2014: 7-14) .
Crucially, how these two factors interact to condition judges' lived experience and their openness to a dialogue with the ECJ remains unexplored. Interviewees suggest that in lower courts, insufficient knowledge of EU law breeds insecurity that can only be remedied by continuing
training, yet workload constraints make it undesirable or impossible to obtain such training. *** Knowledge and judicial reputation: Like most judges in Europe, Italian judges are drawn to the image of the Montesquieuian judge as the knowledgeable "voice of the law." 26 As a result, insufficient training in EU law -beginning in law school 27 and continuing within the judiciaryputs them in an uncomfortable position they would rather avoid. And although opportunities to 26 The Latin expression often cited by interviewees is iura novit curia -"courts know the law." 27 EU law only became a mandatory examination field in Italian law schools between 1995 and 2000 (Bartolini and Guerrieri 2017: 420) .
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obtain EU training have increased in recent years, these opportunities are often insufficient to stay up-to-date on a continuously-evolving and complex area of law, generating insecurity.
In interviews, judges discussed their colleagues' scarce EU legal knowledge with some discomfort, as if confiding a secret: "Let me tell you, quite sincerely," confides a judge who began his career at the Tribunal of Palermo, "that the dialogue with the ECJ has been lacking over the years for one primary reason that is often unstated: That EU law has not been well known in our legal order... to this day, conducting research on the website of the ECJ is problematic for some "Every judge's concern" is that "the lawyer exploits this knowledge of his and tries to manipulate the judge, and make him pose a question that is not founded," confirms a retired judge of first instance, "and the judge that gives into this seduction errs." 36 Second, insufficient knowledge of EU law breeds insecurity vis-à-vis dialoguing with the ECJ. Lower court judges highlight that their inexperience with drafting preliminary references engenders a fear of being publicly embarrassed should their referral be declared inadmissible. This concern is not unfounded: One recent study finds that the ECJ is four times more likely to declare a lower court reference inadmissible than a reference from a court of last instance (Kelemen and Pavone 2017 everyday work practices provides an answer.
The most important constraint reveals itself the second one enters a city's palace of justice:
The ubiquity of stacks of fascicoli (case files). The importance of files as material objects of judicial practice has already been evidenced by Latour (2010: 70-106) and Zan (2003) ; In this instance, files are a physical reminder to lower court judges of the daily duties that remove the gloss from a prospective encounter with EU law or the ECJ. One first instance judge in Bari confessed that when she was first appointed, her docket comprised some 13,000 fascicoli. 40 41 The impact of these workload constraints -which are most pronounced in courts of first instance since some lawsuits are not appealed -is to encode a Foucaultian form of diffuse discipline (Foucault 1975) within everyday practice that resists encounters with 'lesser' known courts and fields of law. The default mindset aims to for the quantitative processing of lawsuits, rather than a creative search for the points of contact between facts, national law, and EU law. As one Genoese judge emphasizes, "given the quantitative aspect of the workload, this can distract from the evaluation of additional" realms of law. 42 Interviewees stress this point through the language they use. Particularly within lower courts, judges speak of being "frustrated," 43 "overwhelmed," 44 and "crushed" 45 by a "massacre-like" 46 stream of lawsuits, which obstructs efforts to "deepen" 47 EU law by "thinking higher." 48 A binary opposition thus arises, between a heavy, everyday workload -symbolized by files whose weight can crush you -and an abstract notion of EU law floating higher, waiting to someday be deepened.
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Exacerbating the flow of lawsuits that discipline judges into avoiding contact with EU law is the career incentive -strongest for lower court judges -to quickly decide cases. Over the past two decades, legislative reforms aiming to bolster the "efficiency" of justice have increased the probability that judges will face penalties should they adjudicate cases slowly. 49 As a longstanding
Milanese judge explains, "we've had much pressure on the part of legislators... to contain the length of proceedings... also because our career can be impacted. We're not punished in a disciplinary way, but, if you're late, as soon as you request a promotion, every four years, it gets blocked, in terms of pay, in terms of advancement." 50 "It's definitely a fear," corroborates a lower court judge in Rome, "also vis-a-vis our hierarchical superiors, or even that we might be held disciplinarily Yet a simple cost-benefit ratio does not do justice to the fact that lower court judges are not used to drafting preliminary references and to think in terms of EU law. And "if you don't apply these things…it's clear that your mastery of these problems erodes." 61 Hence to submit a reference means breaking up an entrenched routine -to "put everything down" only when you feel "really, really obligated" to refer. 62 One judge highlights the psychological reaction that can be caused by this rupture: "There were some oral arguments were I brought along 500 files... you can understand that if in one of those files someone questioned the constitutional legitimacy of an Italian law, I
would already get the shivers… so let's not even talk about a question linking national law to international law!" 63 The breakup of everyday practice can prove so burdensome that some judges feel compelled to work on weekends or to take vacation days 64 in order to write a preliminary reference.
A first instance judge in Palermo shares how for his first referral to the ECJ, "for two weeks I didn't do anything else... because this was a new domain for me, I had to study... everything that was piling up at the regional administrative court and the tax court, I had to make it up by working evenings and weekends." 65 This angst of "everything piling up" is precisely why lower court judges usually relapse into searching for an "escape" from a dialogue with the ECJ. For those few judges determined to dialogue with the European Court, the only option is often to await the arrival of an experienced Eurolawyer and partially rely on their labor: As one Milanese judge confides, "if one of the parties doesn't request it... you don't sit there stimulating it.'' 66
Cultural Resistance
The foregoing conclusions raise a final puzzle: Why do so many judges remain reticent to dialogue with the ECJ even when a Eurolawyer articulates why and how they might author a preliminary reference? "In asking them," one Eurolawyer in Rome emphasizes, "sometimes judges have preferred, how should I put it, to interpret [national] law in my favor rather than to refer to the Court!" 67 And in Palermo, one lawyer notes how in a recent set of labor disputes, all of his requests for a preliminary reference were rejected, often without motivation. 68 In many cases, there is more to this judicial resistance than workload constraints and insufficient training.
One potentially relevant dimension explored by Wind (2010) is a cultural resistance fostered when judges internalize the norms and ideology of a majoritarian political culture. But persuasive though Wind's analysis may be, one would not expect it to generalize to a fragmented constitutional order like Italy. And yet to put it bluntly, for many Italian judges becoming a European judge of first instance ready to dialogue with the ECJ is neither attractive nor a priority. This is particularly true for lower court judges. One first instance judge describes this diffuse perspective in this way: "I study what interests me, also because the reference procedure is only obligatory for courts of last instance, and not for me."
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In the space created by this formally legitimate zone of discretion, a traditional selfconception of lower court judges as faithful appliers of Parliamentary statutes that only dialogue with their Constitutional Court can germinate. The contours of this cultural resistance are tied to the civil law conception of the judge as a faithful applier of the laws promulgated by Parliament who eschews personal, creative impulses to make law (Merryman and Perez-Perdomo (2007: 34-37) . To support this claim, in this section I first underscore the reputational costs that threaten those judges who do empower themselves via EU law. I then provide interview evidence demonstrating that many lower court judges continue to favor a more limited role as national, civil law judges over a more powerful role as European judges of first instance.
*** Three (iconoclastic) perspectives on cultural resistance: Studying the impact of something as fickle yet ubiquitous as judicial culture is extremely challenging. While no approach is fool-proof, one strategy is to tap the experience of those (few) judges who broke with said culture -oftentimes for motives in line with the JET -and trace any pushback they received.
In this light, the experience of three first instance judges stands out: Francesco Mariuzzo at the Regional Administrative Court of Lombardy, Michele Marchesiello at the Tribunal of Genoa, and Paolo Coppola at the Tribunal of Naples. Each of these judges availed themselves of EU law in line with the expectations of the JET. And each of these efforts was criticized by their colleagues, often limiting aspirations of becoming judges of last instance, and -in one caseprovoking a threat of disciplinary sanction.
To begin, becoming an EU judge of first instance means "putting yourself in discussion,"
as one lower court judge put it. 70 This is particularly true when the application of EU law results 70 Ernesta Tarantino, Tribunal of Bari, March 20, 2017 (in-person) .
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in the disapplication of national law, which translates into a perception of rebelling against the very State of which one is a part. For Francesco Mariuzzo, this was precisely the point: As a fiercely independent-minded judge who believed that the Italian administrative justice system was too proximate to public authorities, he began in the 1990s to refer questions to the ECJ in earnest whenever he strongly disagreed with the judgments of Genoese lawyers to punt many references to the ECJ as judge at the city court of first instance. 74 In particular, he was convinced that "EU law was a great opportunity to lessen the distance to the common law judge... to not be a bureaucrat." Yet just as Mariuzzo emphasized that his rebelliousness was sui generis, Marchesiello underscores that few of his colleagues are comfortable with the power afforded by assessing the conformity of national law with EU law. As a result, some of his own preliminary references and rulings invoking EU law were dismissed as insufficiently formal efforts to attract attention via "journalistic" judgments. "Our judiciary remains very functionalist," Marchesiello laments, "they're professionals in a way, but they're also From diffuse reticence to occasional rebellion: While the foregoing judges are unique in the degree to which they internalized the role of European judge, less iconoclastic judges tasked with training their colleagues on the matter tend to reach similar conclusions. That is, the general marginalization of EU law in the national judicial culture is a common lament. And in rare occasions, there is evidence that lower court judges can be as willing as their superiors to openly rebel against EU law and the authority of the ECJ.
The marginalization of EU law in national judicial culture -a "narrow vision" breeding "resistance towards the communitarian phenomenon" -was cited as a key motive for establishing 77 Lawyer and law professor, University of Rome (date redacted; in-person). 78 Paolo Coppola, Tribunal of Naples, February 13, 2017 (in-person where nearly eight out of ten referrals to the ECJ are submitted by lower courts, those few judges who are enthusiastic about dialoguing with their European counterparts underline the associated reputational costs. The only practices that can be described as "wide" are those that incentivize judges to inhabit fields of law over which they have mastery, to manage large quantities of judicial work by limiting breakups of routine, and to interpret their judicial review powers narrowly. Each of these mutually-reinforcing logics is an obstacle to encounters with EU law and the ECJ.
But what are the implications of such a finding, and does the evidence "disconfirm" the JET? Such a conclusion would be too strong. As recent scholarship in case study methods has shown (Gerring 2007) , a "crucial case" can only "disconfirm" a hypothesis to the extent that said hypothesis makes a universal and deterministic causal claim. Ambitious though the works of Weiler (1991) , Burley and Mattli (1993) and Alter (1996) may have been, to impute a universalist determinism to them would amount to building a straw man.
A more fruitful approach would be to qualify the explanatory power of the JET by articulating scope conditions. The first qualification is to stress how the thesis is a perceptive account of the effects of European integration on the power of national judges, but may be less robust than previously thought as a causal account of national judges' decision to support or resist European legal integration. Doubtless, the power to disapply national law that contravenes EU 89 As Alter (1996: 466) puts it, "lower courts found few costs and numerous benefits in making their own referrals to the ECJ and in applying EC law." law, or to cite a preliminary ruling from the ECJ when breaking from the jurisprudence of a high court, constitutes an awesome broadening of ordinary national courts' judicial toolkit.
Nevertheless, this article suggests that while judges who sought to empower themselves via a dialogue with the ECJ do exist, they were and remain the exception rather than the rule.
Understanding why most judges, to this day, choose not to empower themselves via EU law is just as important as understanding why a few of them do.
In a sense, these findings support to the initial skepticism of the JET expressed by Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998b: 70-71) . However, it deviates from their work by casting doubt on the claim that the judicial construction of Europe nonetheless constitutes a "self-sustaining logic of institutionalization" (Ibid: 72) . For national judges -especially within lower courts -deviating from their traditional role as efficient, expert appliers of domestic law is not a costless process of institutional conversion, nor is it an obviously desirable transformation of their everyday practice.
By drawing on historical institutionalist insights into how "change agents" must confront a preexisting institutional constellation that constrains their efforts (Thelen and Mahoney 2010), it becomes clear that there is nothing automatically self-reinforcing about lower courts collaborating to promote European integration.
This conclusion can reorient scholars to study subtler yet more diffuse forms of resistance to transnational governance than the explicit rebellions of supreme courts (ex. Rasmussen 2007) or legislative-executive forms of non-codification (ex. Falkner et al. 2008; Martinsen 2015 ) that have garnered much important attention. Namely, by probing how institutional path-dependencies limit the degree to which European integration is embedded within the routines of local courts, researchers would uncover a privileged context for studying the various ways in which transnational governance is negotiated and resisted "far from its well-recognized, well-marked official sites" (Sarat and Kearns 1995: 7) . This matters because it is at the 'street level' -before courts of first instance -that most ordinary citizens have an opportunity to come into contact with the authority of transnational legal orders like the EU. To the extent that diffuse institutional constraints and entrenched habits dissuade lower courts from fully availing themselves of their new powers under EU law, the "on the ground" reach of Europe's legal authority stands to remain "contained" (Conant 2002 ). A second conclusion would be that the JET should no longer be assumed to be a sufficient explanation of the causal origins of the judicial construction of Europe, even within the EU's founding member states. As previously noted, out of the six founding EU member states, Italy has by far the greatest and most enduring share of preliminary reference activity originating from lower or what has more broadly been termed the 'judicialization' of politics (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002; Hirschl 2008) . The JET has played a central role in solidifying the image of Europe as a self-reinforcing "judicial construction" (Stone Sweet 2004) , and it has served as a referent for how transnational legal orders outside of Europe could "transplant" the process of regional integration through law (Alter & Helfer 2017) . While it would be incorrect to infer from the foregoing evidence that judicial politics do not underlie supranational governance in Europe, the centrality of the drive to power of national lower courts ought to be contextualized and qualified. "Ruthless egoism" does not do "the trick by itself," as Burley and Mattli (1993: 54) claim, nor is it relatively costless for judges to indulge their drive for self-empowerment, as Alter suggests (1996: 466) .
Seemingly inconsequential nitty-gritty tasks -like managing one's workload -can ossify into diffuse and institutionalized practices of enormous consequence to the actors responsible for negotiating transnational governance on the ground. And as international and supranational rules 38 are layered atop domestic institutions and spark a micro-politics of everyday practice, actors hitherto receiving less attention -like stubborn "Eurolawyers" (Vauchez 2015) who push judges to break out of their routines and avail themselves of transnational law -may oftentimes play a more central role than judges alone.
In short, re-contextualizing judges within a broader constellation of actors and webs of quotidian practice that resist institutional change stands to uncover both the practical limits ofand alternative pathways to -the judicial construction of transnational governance.
